Title: The Consistency of the Recent US Unilateral Tariff Measures with the GATT Security Exception

Author: Xiaoli Shi, Wei Guo

Abstract: Ever since Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency in January 2025, the state’s unilateral trade restrictions justified on the grounds of an expanding notion of “national security” have intensified. In July, the US again imposed additional tariffs on Brazil and India, citing human rights and energy trade with Russia as justifications. At the WTO, the US constantly invoked the security exception of GATT in disputes raised by its additional tariff measures, rejecting the jurisdiction of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). However, the text of WTO agreements and previous dispute settlement precedents affirm that the DSB has undisputed jurisdiction over disputes invoking the security exception clause. Furthermore, the reasons advanced by the US for imposing additional tariffs on its trade partners do not fall within the scope of “essential security interests” defined by Article XXI of the GATT, amounting instead to an abuse of the security exception. Reactions from other states to such unilateral US tariff measures have been mixed: some countries have chosen to compromise and negotiate settlements with the US, while a smaller number have initiated consultations at the WTO, and the relevant disputes have yet to be adjudicated. In light of the growing trend of weaponized trade policies, all countries should actively articulate their opposition in order to safeguard their own developmental interests. Furthermore, the revision of the GATT security exception could be incorporated into the WTO reform agenda, improving the exception rule by incorporating language such as “to be interpreted in good faith” and consolidating consensus among WTO Members during the reform process.

Keywords: GATT, Security Exception, Generalization of National Security, WTO Reform